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My Paradigm Can Beat Your Paradigm:
Some Reflections on Knowledge Conflicts
GLENN 0. HAWORTH
Emeritus Professor of Social Work
San Diego State University
Disagreements about knowledge generation and application in social
work are examined from a paradigmatic level to try to account for the
moral indignation often accompanying the disagreements. The positivist
paradigm with its pervasive influence on social science inquiry has been
challenged in recent times by a more relativistic, interactive, conscious-
ness based paradigm. The problem of "standardizing Intersubjectivity",
and the process of "Inversion of Mastery", are used to examine the
paradigm differences. The positivist's accusation that the newer paradigm
advocate is "irresponsible", and the rejoinder that positivism contributes
to a "damaging hoax" on humankind are the crux of the moral heat of
the conflict.
In recent years some different ideas about knowledge, re-
search, and practice in Social Work have been struggling to be
heard and meeting resistance. To add to the struggle in a 1984
article, I attempted to cover a number of converging ideas as
a possible contribution to new thinking. While reviewing the
social work literature on the debates about knowledge, scien-
tific method(s), empiricism, etc., it was obvious that each side
in the debates carried a barely controlled undercurrent of ex-
asperation at the wrong-headedness of the other camp. I sug-
gested that "Challenges to these intuitive givens [paradigmatic
assumptions] are sources of considerable anxiety, and conflicts
often include moral overtones" (Haworth, 1984, p. 354).
One particular conflict was between Fischer and Gordon re-
garding whether social work has a paradigm, and if so, whether
it resulted from revolution or evolution (Fischer, 1981; Gordon,
1983). The squabble generated the following:
Gordon's response consists mainly of a plethora of periphras-
tic platitudes, a gallimaufry of obfuscations and misunderstood
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
quotes taken out of context, a hodgepodge of inconsistencies and
non sequitors, a mish-mash of outdated conceptions, a grab bag
of unsupported speculations, and a hugger-mugger of self-serving
self-references. Other than that, Gordon's response was excellent
(Fischer, 1984, p. 71).
Because I was trained in science- not rhetoric or innuendo- it is a
bit difficult to respond to Fischer's blast at me and my article, "So-
cial Work Revolution or Evolution?" I do not need much valuable
space in SOCIAL WORK to respond, because Fischer's statement
in this issue does a pretty good job of exposing his techniques
against which I inveighed in my criticism of his original article. I
must have successfully unveiled the real Fischer or he would not
have tried to hide behind such unrestrained verbal abuse, name-
calling, and general lashing out to redefine the issues in a way that
attempts to put his ideas in a better light (Gordon, 1984, p. 74).
The delicate interchange is particularly interesting since the
combatants both, perhaps of different generations, represent the
same paradigm.* One can imagine that "heat" if they really
disagreed with each other! The paradigm in question began to
"revolt" or "evolve" out of the hard sciences in the 1930s, but is
still alive in social science for some reason. By contrasting the
consequences of an emerging paradigm with the established
belief system I try to account for some of the heat of a moral
nature generated by the conflict in world views held by sincere
people, all claiming to be reasonable and scientific.
The Paradigms
One way to approach this phenomenon is to contrast the
conflicting positions on the place of subjectivity and intersub-
jectivity in knowledge. But first, a brief look at the paradigms
is necessary. The positions have no high consensus labels, but
generally they represent two scientific heritages. The older, tra-
ditional view, which I refer to as Positivism, still carries the
image of a Newtonian universe (deterministic and mechanical)
and Cartesian dualism (mind-matter separation) into social in-
quiry. This positivist view is deeply embedded in our culture as
synonymous with Scientific Method. The emerging naturalistic,
* The title of the present paper is prompted by the story of two Hollywood
tykes arguing, "My dad can beat your dad,"... "Oh yeh, your dad is my dad."
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or New paradigm poses a very different reality including rela-
tivity, the inseparability of the data from the consciousness of
the investigator, and a nature based on information generat-
ing processes.** It derives its appeal for those open to the view
by appearing to account more satisfactorily for much more hu-
man experience. It is not my purpose to recount all the details
here, but rather to account for the profound distress the conflict
creates.
Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity
As human attempts to understand nature moved from re-
liance on the authority of revelation, tradition, and political
power to basing understanding on the experience of the senses,
certain problems became critical and are still with us. The ex-
periences had to be ordered by the individual (subjectivity) and
communicated to others for confirmation (intersubjectivity). Ac-
companying this beginning of modem science was a further
institutionalization in Western thought of a belief in the separa-
tion of Mind and Matter (Descartes). The problem of knowing
was cast in the form of a private entity (mind) taking in the
meaning of sensory information from external public entities
(matter), and somehow sharing it with a community of minds.
Subjective report has always been suspect in human inter-
action due to the hidden private nature of its origin. People
lie to each other, and themselves, to attain many social and
personal ends. Disagreements occur that can often only be rec-
onciled by coercion of various sorts. In science disagreements
were not, and are not, generally seen as lies, but as problems
in human perception. Even as instrumentation evolved to ex-
tend the human senses, the problem of disagreement in sub-
jective report could not be technically overcome. Consequently,
much effort has gone into searching for procedures for recon-
ciliation of experiential differences that avoid the earlier coer-
cions of power relations. These attempts have tended to follow
a logic that gives primacy to "objects" that are experienced as
** In "The future of social work research," Pieper (1985) suggests calling this
newer position the "Heuristic Approach". My preference is to resist any par-
ticular short hand reference in favor of requiring each of us in the controversy
to explain what we mean as often as possible.
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occupying space and time, and seem to have a separate "out-
thereness" aspect. Somehow it seemed that we should be able to
construct "objective" standards that reflect the real dimensions
of nature around which "intersubjectivity" could be standardized
(see Sampson, 1981, for further development of this idea). The
idiosyncracies of subjectivity were felt to be controllable by a
language of analysis, measurement, and quantification that was
free of any particular everyday cultural language. These proce-
dures have worked so well in some areas of investigation that
scientific method came to be seen as a route to knowledge that
could by-pass subjectivity and intersubjectivity.
There have always been enough anomalies and residual
problems to keep most serious scientists from a complete accep-
tance of a reality of "objectivity", even though it is often seen as
a desirable aspiration. Particularly in physics, the hardest of the
sciences, the success of the procedures became their own down-
fall. The extension of human curiosity and instrumental intru-
sion into nature led to a confrontation with the impact of both
the instrumentation and the curiosity. The objective measures
eroded the view that the world is made of objects, in favor of a
view of nature as fields of energy and information "potential".
As a result certain aspects of the investigator's subjectivity had
to be reconsidered.
Twentieth century physics is the story of the reluctant move-
ment from the classical mechanistic world view to the startling
implications of Quantum mechanics. The "Copenhagen solu-
tion" of Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg brought several
aspects to awareness (Capra, 1975). For one, the instrumenta-
tion of investigation produces data by interaction, not objective
observation. And even more sobering, the instrumentation is
guided by human curiosity and consciousness. That is, unless a
human being asks a question and there is enough group consen-
sus that the answer would have value, scientific investigation
does not take place. No matter how much we pretend other-
wise, subjectivity and intersubjectivity precede investigation as
well as influence the perception and interpretation of data, and
the choice of what to study is a value choice.
The remarkable success of scientific method in many ar-
eas has reinforced the belief in objective discovery. However,
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as one's thinking moves away from the assumptions of an ob-
jective discoverable reality to more plausible views of a con-
structed, or created, reality the account of how science succeeds
changes (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, chap. 3). The language of quan-
tity and measurement seems to work on information that does
not seem to be initially organized by human linguistic structures
(perhaps the information that preceded our species' conscious
existence, that we experience as light, sound, motion, etc., before
we give them names). The subjective invention of "variables"
can be constructed linguistically and used to organize the pro-
cesses of observation and measurement. The procedures then
create the existence of the variable by a response. If the response
produces an outcome deemed valuable by the community it is
felt that a "discovery" has been made. Under these conditions
an investigation can produce a nonvalued result and be con-
sidered "wrong". Since the data have not, as far as we know,
interpreted the measurement procedures, further investigation
can be pursued to seek valued findings without doing great
harm. For instance, light apparently does not care whether we
set up apparatus to measure it as a wave phenomenon, or a
particle phenomenon. It accommodates both, and goes on do-
ing whatever it does. Light suffers little damage even though
the reputation of one of the researchers may.
However, if the phenomenon being measured is already the
product of interpersonal, intersubjective, and linguistic organi-
zation (society, personality, culture, science, etc.), we enter a
realm where the data are not only generated and organized by
a response to the measurement procedures, but by an interpre-
tation of them. The inseparable involvement of the physicist's
consciousness and actions in the generation of his findings be-
comes confounded even more in the human sciences where the
data source is essentially another investigator.
Both paradigms need to standardize intersubjectivity in
some way. The positivist relies on the notion of a reality external
to the observer that is independent of the observer's subjectivity.
In seeking order, the array of subjective variations in report be-
come statistically reduced to create a hypothetical structure that
is assumed to be the best estimate of the underlying reality and
can serve as an external standard to appeal to for agreement.
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
The new paradigm advocate tries to standardize intersub-
jectivity by appeal to shared value commitments. The variations
in subjective experience are not seen as imperfect perceptions of
a common structure, but as the reality of human existence. The
new paradigm view is that there is no mechanical causal con-
nection between social events, that continuity and meaning are
intersubjective agreements. Value is attached to consciousness
of this process and the responsibility for its outcome.
Inversion of Mastery
The apt phrase "inversion of mastery" is used by Edward
Sampson to refer to the consequence of the uncritical use of
the traditional paradigm as a guide to psychological investiga-
tion (Sampson, 1981). The process works something like this.
The commitment to objective observation tends to focus on the
repetitive and apparently stable processes of nature which are
then named and the names reified into "structures", or Platonic
"essences", or "laws". These intersubjectively named regular-
ities are defined as transcending any particular event. Based
on these assumptions some of nature can be manipulated by
human efforts and the outcomes give a sense of mastery, in
that we seem to have approximated portions of natural pro-
cesses sufficiently to predict and control them, at least in the
short run. As noted above, nature responds to these manipula-
tions, but doesn't interpret them. For instance, nature doesn't
seem to care if we convert all the information that is in material
form on earth into energy by the magnitude of a mind-boggling
constant squared (E=MC2). Fortunately for human beings, so
far these reactions have had some self-limiting aspects. How-
ever, the earth could very easily respond to our tinkering by
conditions lethal to human life, and indeed seems to be do-
ing so. Yet the heady feeling of understanding the underly-
ing laws, or causes, of certain regularities and the attendant
technical mastery is very difficult for humans to resist, even if
deadly.
When science has focused on human action the same as-
pirations of mastery through prediction and control have pre-
vailed. However, as stated above the subject matter is already
a secondary ordering of information by human intersubjective
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processes, even though the senses seem to be taking in infor-
mation about structures that precede the individual investiga-
tor. These social inventions do persist beyond the experience
of individuals, but they only exist through the participation of
individuals. The proposing of variables and their measurement
has tended to follow theories based on the traditional model of
seeking underlying causes for human events that are universal,
context-free, and beyond human choice.
Instrumentation also tends to be regarded as mechanical
extensions of the investigator's senses. However, these instru-
ments are communication devices that not only demand re-
sponse, but also elicit interpretation (for example: a Question-
naire item; I believe in life after death-SA, A, MA, MD, D, SD.
"What does that mean? I have no idea, I'm not sure there is life
after birth yet! Let's see, the guy who asked us to do this looked
nice enough-a little shy and pious perhaps. I'll bet he wants
me to agree with the statement, and since there is no neutral
point on the scale, I'll help him toward his M.A. degree with
a "Mildly Agree"). The process may be harmless enough with
college sophomores in Psychology classes where the only thing
at stake is credit for class participation, although the published
results could have some influence.
When the instrumentation is aimed at information related
to life chances of individuals and groups the outcome can be,
and is, very dangerous. Sampson argues that the assumptions
we accept to scientifically validate the measurement of individ-
ual variations are the very assumptions that are used to socially
construct and institutionalize the inequalities that the social sci-
entist is called upon to study. At any particular time social or-
der is maintained by, and maintains, individuals locating each
other in social roles and relationships to which they attribute
substantive reality. He notes that
... the building blocks of positivist empiricism, truncated sub-
jectivism, and abstracted individualism on which psychology's
deep structure is based contribute to societal reproduction and
are primarily ideological in their function. Insofar as the exist-
ing socioeconomic and sociocultural system generates the neces-
sary domination of the many by the few, psychology's role is to
help foster the very self understandings that reproduce both the
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underlying system and its accompanying system of domination
and unfreedom. (Sampson, 1981, p. 131)
Briefly, these terms refer to interlinking influences. The
adoption of the traditional scientific paradigm by psychology
gives primacy to data directly available to the senses (positivist
empiricism) and leads to considering current categories of social
construction as universal "givens" of nature. The consequent
neglect of sociohistorical processes tends to focus attention on
internal causality residing within the individuals being scien-
tifically analysed. The result is that "psychology's subjectivism
is truncated in that it places a main burden on the mentation
of the individual; the material reality enters the equation, but
only in terms already processed by the actor's meaning en-
dowing capacities" (Sampson, 1981, p. 88). The final link, ab-
stracted individualism, refers to the support of an exaggerated
illusion of automony and independence, or the American belief
in "self-efficacy". This all too easily supports translating system
inequality into individual deficit. Therefore, when psychology
addresses the problems of social justice it contributes to the pro-
cesses of social control and the perpetuation of the status quo.
The positivist paradigm has led the behavioral and social
scientists to treat the social constructions in the same way that
Newtonian physicists approached nature. That is, the current
social taxonomies are accepted as "givens", to be analysed, mea-
sured, and accounted for by principles that cannot include hu-
man consciousness and choice (except as illusory manifestations
of a more material causal order).
Stephen Jay Gould (1981), in THE MISMEASURE OF MAN,
traces the devastating history of use of scientific method to clas-
sify and order groups of people in American society. From the
measuring of skulls and bodies to I.Q.s, a hierarchy of group
relations has been maintained that curiously supports the very
tenets of a capitalist economy, its competitiveness, and the in-
stitutionalized inequalities that are needed to make it work. Of
particular potency is the American conversion of Binet's early
interest in testing children for educational planning into the
measurement of some innate capacity called Intelligence. The
logic of quantification and discovery diverted attention away
from the situational and interactive nature of the testing itself
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(and overpowered the critics in the process). Even more signif-
icantly, the loop back to the institutionalizating of the findings
into subtle, and not so subtle, social expectations was obscured.
This means-ends division, or more correctly, the unques-
tioning acceptance of ends followed by the technical pursuit
of means, is also central to the classification of many human
problems. The utility and morality of locating the source of
bothersome behaviors within the individual does not receive
much cultural or professional skepticism. Rather, attention is
directed to the construction of correct classification schemes,
and the procedures for the correct assignment of individuals
to the categories (the recalcitrance of some of these problems
is shown by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual beginning
to develop sequels with Roman numerals at almost the rate of
"Rocky" movies). The declared goals of "treatment", or some
matching of talents to social tasks in the case of intelligence
testing, are subverted by more potent processes of social con-
trol and maintenance of the historically developed inequalities.
In other words, the categories of outcomes of social processes
are studied, described, and explained in such a way as to imply
that the outcome "variables" were there at the beginning and
"caused" the events to come about in some inevitable fashion.
A central point they [Critical Theorists] derive from the story is the
deceit of the human mind that results as people seek to conquer
nature by first conquering what is nature in themselves: this is the
dialectic of enlightenment. The forces marshaled to master nature
turn about and become the forces in whose name the mastery of
nature was itself sought.
Horkeimer and Adorno see the subject seeking to govern the ob-
ject (nature) and in this very process being swallowed up and
destroyed. The identity between subject and object eventually de-
stroys the subject itself. The dialectic represents the process
whereby what begins affirmatively as the conquest, administra-
tion, and technical control of nature ends up creating just its
opposite- namely, self-understandings from the viewpoint of tech-
nical control. The result is a technocratic consciousness or instru-
mentalized rationality in which the core of domination is both
contained and concealed (Sampson, 1981, p. 64).
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The Judgments
Whence comes the moral indignation when someone gives
an account for a social phenomenon that does not match our
own account? We are just beginning to recognize the embed-
dedness of our observations and conclusions in powerful beliefs
that give order to our group and individual existence. These be-
lief systems (paradigms) offer proof of truth, or trustworthiness,
of conclusions only within themselves. When the arguments of a
paradigm are taken to another paradigm for consideration they
inevitably encounter judgments of falsity. To decide between
paradigms requires a transcending paradigm which is never
clear. Consequently, a sort of dialectic goes on historically. At
present it seems that the thesis of positivism in social science
is being challenged by the antithesis of new paradigm stirrings
that cannot be dismissed quite as easily as before. If a synthesis
is possible it is not likely to emerge immediately. As mentioned
in the above quote Critical Theory has some possibilities, but
that discussion is not my purpose here.
The judgments I am concerned with are the ones based
on disagreements over the correct path to knowledge, and the
consequences of the kind of knowledge produced for improv-
ing our understanding of the relation between knowledge and
practice in social work. The issues of intersubjectivity and in-
version of mastery can get at the nature of these judgmental
conflicts. From the positivist heritage these issues tend to be
seen as nonexistent or amenable to technical solutions. The be-
lief in an orderly, deterministic, measurable reality underlying
human action promotes the value of finding out what that order
is, and controlling it. For this process to work, the generating
of the data must be seen as "discovery" of the external reality
by imperfect human perceivers (certainly not as the inversion
of mastery). The tendency for holders of the traditional view
is to see the advocate of a constructed, relativistic, descriptive,
value-oriented scientific paradigm as being irresponsible. That
is, by questioning the pursuit of objective causal knowledge the
new paradigm advocate is accused of depriving people of tools
for handling their anxiety and their unpredictableness to each
other-of leaving them ungrounded and floating, without solid
anchors.
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The accusations going the other way are the mirror image
in a sense. If nature is seen as flux ordered by information of
which human consciousness is inseparable, then positivism is
seen as perpetrating a very damaging hoax on humankind. By en-
gaging in transactions that claim to discover causal explanation
(or probabilistic correlations, which are even more mystifying),
the "outcomes" of the human pursuit of order are interpreted
as the cause of the pursuit. This somewhat enigmatic statement
also relates to an earlier suggestion that social structures require
participation for existence and maintenance. We precipitate out
artifacts to remind ourselves; such as, codes, costumes, build-
ings, implements, recorded traces of prior events, etc. However,
these guide-posts mean nothing without current actors giving
them expression. Using these guides we constantly create and
recreate our society. The spillage and surplus activity in this
process must be accommodated.
Collectively we organize and maintain all sorts of reciprocal
roles and definitions to deal with actions judged to be threaten-
ing to social order and meanings (an arena where social work-
ers often find themselves). Historically our society has defined
many of these categories for classifying deviant behaviors and
the response to them as medical-like problems. Confusion re-
sults between beliefs that the behavior is a manifestation of an
invading agent in the human being versus somewhat older be-
liefs attributing the behaviors to deliberate choice or evil. The
problems are studied from a perspective that includes neither
choice, nor evil in human affairs. Hence, the positivist's ex-
planations lose the social history and creative interactions of
the definitional processes, and focus on perceived character-
istics of the already identified individuals. Commonalities are
stressed, measured, and names given to variables which then
become explanations for why the individuals are in their so-
cial positions. The causes, due to the guiding paradigm, are
located beyond the control of the individual actor. Not incon-
sequentially, the reciprocal role of expert treater gets created
and maintained. Rather than knowledge freeing humans to rec-
ognize and assume responsibility for creating more humane
relationships and institutions, the status quo tends to be rein-
forced by scientific support. Human anxiety may occasionally
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
be relieved by an illusion of causality and control, but at the
price of human freedom and creativity. Therefore, the new para-
digm believer develops strong feelings of indignation at the
continued unquestioning use of the traditional methods.
Brief Illustration of Paradigms in Action
How might the conflict look in "clinical" practice? Imagine
two social workers, similarly licensed and proclaiming the same
set of abstract values, but different in their paradigmatic stances.
Dick is basically a positivist, while Jane is attracted to the new
paradigm. The controversy is often cast in gender metaphors
which relate positivism to male dominance and intellectual mas-
tery, and female nuturance and emotional understanding are
equated with the new paradigm stance. I acknowledge some
usefulness to these formulations and hence name my workers
accordingly.
The sociohistorical processes that influence a person to be-
come a "client" in contact with a "helper", and policies and
structures that locate them in the same place whether it be an
agency, private practice, or some other auspice, will be of very
different concern to the two workers. Dick is more likely to
see all this as "natural", since his belief system is more closely
related to the social structure that has generated the whole prob-
lem definition/helping situation. His value based task of re-
lating to the client as possessing "dignity", with perhaps even
goals of "empowerment", etc. will be seen as problems of "tech-
nique." Jane will find the situation much more problematic. For
her the processes are very much a part of subtly defining the
"problem" as personal failure or moral defect. Such definitions
make dignity and empowerment doubtful, if not absurd goals.
The process must somehow be countered by liberating aware-
ness on the part of Jane and her client.
Once the client and worker are in social contact, some sort
of "assessment" is mandated in order for contact to continue
(both paradigms are trying to shed some of the medical-like
trappings of "diagnosis"). Dick will essentially ask the client to
hold the problem in abeyance while information is gathered to
locate the problem in some classification scheme of problems. In
attempts to standardize practice delivery the scheme more and
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more in use is the APA Diagnostic and Statistical Manual in its
most current form. Much of the information gathered, with the
client's participation, will be defined as "objective", whether it
be self-report, responses to tests, physical examinations, etc. The
material will tend to be organized in such a way as to locate
the "cause" of the problem in the biography of the client, even
though the rhetoric involves social "factors," or an additional
"axis," or two in the manual. In any case the material will tend
to be treated as additive and linear. All this must take place
before "intervention" can be planned and executed.
Jane, on the other hand, would find all this distressing for a
number of reasons. First, a human being, particularly one who
is hurting or confused, cannot be asked to wait for some imper-
sonal procedures to be performed, before "real" help is offered.
Second, all human communication and action is seen as "inter-
vention," and the pretense of "objective" measurement will be
given subjective meaning by the client. Consequently, Jane will
focus on the person's biography, but also as much, if not more,
on the client's current action world and the subjective inter-
pretation of it, particularly on what is happening in the helping
process. As does Dick, Jane will locate the client's problem in the
classification scheme, but the process will be different. Dick is
likely to present the category chosen as a description of reality,
to which the client belongs. Jane is likely to present the infor-
mation as a judgment that had to be made in order for help to
be attempted under current practices. "Solving the client's prob-
lem" may not have much to do with the description contained
in the category. The current efforts at behavioral description,
rather than etiology, in DSMIII onward are attempts to stan-
dardize classification across theoretical differences. However, it
would not be unlikely that Dick and Jane could choose differ-
ent categories to label the same client. Dick would emphasize
the importance of accuracy of diagnosis, while Jane would be
more concerned with managing the meaning of a designation
of "mental disorder" in the client's life situation.
Intervention will also be different. Dick will proceed on the
assumption that a direct causal connection can be made be-
tween the interventive acts and desired outcomes, dictated by
the problem assessment. Jane thinks she has been intervening
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all the time, perhaps even before the client showed up through
whatever she has been thinking that could possibly question
the established practices. Her efforts to help are more likely to
focus simultaneously on the client's subjective meanings and
the social context that defines the client's problem.
When these two workers encounter each other to discuss
practice, conflict is likely to be high regarding preferred theo-
ries and practice modalities. Covertly, or overtly, implications of
doubtful moral action are likely to be present. Jane stresses the
meaning to the client of the processes that are being imposed in
the name of helping, and for her the measurements and judg-
ments are mystifying and degrading to the participants, and
perhaps are a continuation of the very social interactions that
precipitated the client's problem. Dick counters that these mea-
surements and judgments are scientific (and that the client's
"reactivity" can be technically controlled or ignored), and that
Jane is irresponsible in not manipulating the client into formulas
for objectively assessing and managing one's life. Jane continues
to argue that essentially mechanical explanations and problem
solutions further remove people from experiencing and respon-
sibly defining their own lives. She stresses that the separation
of people from their experiences is supported by the promise
that structures for understanding and control do objectively ex-
ist, when according to the new paradigm they do not, and this
is the damaging hoax.
Conclusion
This paper is obviously written from a new paradigm po-
sition, otherwise the presentation would be very different, or
not made at all. "Normal" social scientists working within an
established position do not raise questions about underlying
assumptions, but tend to judge each other in terms of tech-
nical efficiency in carrying out the paradigmatic implications.
The challenging suggestion that that positivist system of knowl-
edge production is flawed by being caught in the circular trac-
ing of social footprints and the perpetuation of social inequality
through scientific justification, prompts indignation from believ-
ers. These persons who have experienced their careers and life
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meanings as being validated in the traditional process do not
take kindly to having their activities defined as harmful.
A part of the positivist paradigm is the belief that contin-
ued empirical investigation will eventually resolve knowledge
differences-so, what's the big fuss? To argue this position an-
other assumption is necessary which separates is from ought,
and makes facts more fundamental than values. It is this fact-
value separation that is challenged by the new paradigm. The
argument is that social facts are socially created from disguised
value premises, and that a human science is needed to make
that process conscious and visible.
Another complication in the conflict of views is that at this
historical time in our culture the new paradigm adherents have
almost inevitably shared the positivist world view in socializa-
tion and education. Consequently, some sort of transformation
or revolution has taken place in their thinking. Like most con-
verts who survive the upheaval of previous beliefs, they become
excited over new ways of seeing and express impatience with
those who remain entrenched.
The conflict could perhaps be defined by some as inconse-
quential if only the philosophical differences about knowledge
were being argued. However, in a helping profession such as so-
cial work, human lives are "intervened" in with outcome goals
stated in value terms. When each side translates their version
of knowledge into action, it is then that the counter charges
of irresponsibility and damaging hoax gain their moral quality as
accusations of harming people.
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